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Background Principles, Takings, and
Libertarian Property:
A Reply to Professor Huffman
Michael C. Blumm∗ & J.B. Ruhl∗∗

One of the principal, if unexpected, results of the Supreme Court’s
1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission is the rise of
background principles of property and nuisance law as a categorical
defense to takings claims. Our writings on the background principles
defense have provoked Professor James Huffman, a devoted advocate for
an expanded use of regulatory takings to protect landowner development
rights, to mistakenly charge us with arguing for the use of common law
principles to circumvent the rule of law, Supreme Court intent, and the
takings clause. Actually, ours was not a normative brief at all, but instead a
positivistic explanation of takings cases in the lower courts since Lucas,
which include judicial recognition of statutory background principles. In
this Article, we respond to Huffman, examining the continuing importance
of the background principles defense and explaining the trouble with his
vision of libertarian property and his peculiar notion of the rule of law. We
focus especially on wetlands regulation, which Huffman thinks is a recent
development when in fact its origins date to medieval England, and
therefore is particularly suited to the background principles defense. We
conclude that background principles, as “the logically antecedent inquiry”
into the nature of a claimant’s property interest, are now a permanent
feature of the takings landscape.

Copyright © 2010 Regents of the University of California.
∗
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INTRODUCTION
One of the surprising results of the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission,1 which established a
categorical rule awarding constitutional compensation to landowners
suffering complete economic wipeouts from government regulation, was
that the categorical rule turned out to be far less consequential than the
exception the Court established for “background principles” of property
and nuisance law. This exception provided the government with a defense
against numerous takings claims.2 Over the last two decades, many courts
have employed the “background principles” defense to uphold
government regulations accused of working unconstitutional losses of
property rights.3 The fact that the author of the Lucas opinion, Justice

1. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
2. Id. at 1029 (stating that regulations that mirror background principles “inhere in the
title itself,” and therefore do not work takings, even if they prohibit all economically beneficial
uses).
3. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005).
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Antonin Scalia, may not have intended this result is perhaps a leading
example of the law of unintended consequences.4
The proliferation of background principles capable of defeating
takings claims has disturbed libertarian property advocates, who call for
increased reliance on the Constitution’s takings clause to restrain
regulatory controls.5 One of the leading advocates of the libertarian
perspective on property is our friend and colleague, Professor Jim
Huffman.6 Huffman has taken both of us to task for writing on the subject
of background principles, although his criticism of our work varies over a
couple of articles.7 We agree with him that the incorporation of the
concept of ecosystem services into the common law of nuisance may not
be smooth or uncomplicated, and that there are questions concerning the
evolution of the common law,8 which we explore at length in Making
Nuisance Ecological.9 However, we think most of his criticism is
misguided, and we want to use this space to respond, explaining why
Huffman’s libertarian perspective on property is ill-suited to the
complexities of the twenty-first century, and why background principles
will remain central to takings jurisprudence in the future.
Our response develops through three sections of analysis, each
divided into several Parts. The first section lays out the broad themes
over which Huffman and we differ. Within this section of analysis, Part I
of this Article illustrates the disconnect in Huffman’s normative critique
of our positivistic work. Part II portrays Huffman’s libertarian notion of
property and its faults. Part III responds to Huffman’s erroneous claim
that background principles do not include statutes or constitutional
provisions.
To ground those fundamentals in practical application, the second
section of analysis works through discrete categories of background
principles to illuminate Huffman’s flawed and incomplete conception of
4. See id. at 322. The phenomenon of unintended consequences in law is so common it has
been elevated to the status of a “law” itself. As one author observes: “There is something called
the ‘Law of Unintended Consequences.’ Who enacted this law, who enforces it, and its exact
scope are obscure. However, from time to time it manifests itself . . . .” A.A. Sommer, Jr., The
Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Preempting Unintended Consequences, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 231 (1997).
5. The most prominent example of this use of the takings clause is in RICHARD EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
6. See James L. Huffman, A Coherent Takings Theory At Last: Comments on Richard
Epstein's “Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain”, 17 ENVTL. L. 153
(1986) (laudatory review of EPSTEIN, supra note 5).
7. See James L. Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years after
Lucas, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Huffman, Background Principles]; James L.
Huffman, Beware of Greens in Praise of the Common Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813 (2008)
[hereinafter Huffman, Beware of Greens].
8. See Huffman, Beware of Greens, supra note 7, at 831–36.
9. See J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 764–80
(2008) [hereinafter Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological].
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history and the common law. Using wetlands as its environmental
medium, Part IV provides a probing history of the common law of
nuisance and the evolution of its background principles from the twelfth
century through modern times, showing that Huffman’s position cannot
withstand scrutiny under the factual record. In less detail, but with no less
a conclusive result, Part V explains the role of the public trust doctrine,
state ownership of wildlife, and customary rights as background
principles.
From there, the third section of analysis addresses remaining
questions we have with Huffman’s account of background principles. Part
VI examines Huffman’s peculiar conception of the “rule of law,” a
curious erection of stasis that professes that some legal changes (but not
others) violate the takings clause. Part VII explains the inevitable role
and continuing importance of background principles in takings analysis.
The Article concludes that Professor Huffman’s attempt to create a
vision of property that was rejected nearly a century ago does not warrant
a judicial revival in the twenty-first century, although he seems interested
in pursuing a political revival.
I.

HUFFMAN’S MISGUIDED NORMATIVE CRITIQUE

We explained the rise of background principles in takings analysis
and the role of nuisance in particular in previous articles, to which
Professor Huffman responded. Huffman’s Background Principles and the
Rule of Law claims that background principles, or at least our
understanding of them, are inconsistent with his vision of the rule of law
and the takings clause and are a distortion of Justice Scalia’s intent.10 An
ensuing piece, Beware of Greens in Praise of Common Law, criticizes
Professor Ruhl’s suggestion that the background principle of nuisance
law is capable of accounting for ecosystem services as part of the takings
calculation, something Huffman considers to be tantamount to judicial
legislation.11 He bases these assertions on his belief that we argue
background principles should be “almost infinitely malleable in hands of
courts and legislatures.”12 Huffman is simply mistaken. Ours was not a
normative argument; instead, it was a positivist study examining the case

10. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 1 (abstract).
11. Huffman, Beware of Greens, supra note 7, at 814 (criticizing J.B. Ruhl, Toward a
Common Law of Ecosystem Services, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1 (2005)); see also Ruhl, Making
Nuisance Ecological, supra note 9; J.B. Ruhl, The Background Principles of Natural Capital and
Ecosystem Services—Did Lucas Open Pandora’s Box?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 525 (2007);
J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Common Law of the “Fragile Land System”, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 3 (2005).
12. Huffman makes this largely unsubstantiated “infinitely malleable” charge repeatedly.
See Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 1 (abstract), 12, 17, 19.
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law interpreting background principles since the Lucas decision.13 We
were not arguing that these principles were, or should be, “infinitely
malleable,” although we did note that Justice Scalia might be surprised at
the results his opinion produced.14
Huffman repeatedly attributes our study of background principles to
a theoretical argument, overlooking the fact that we were describing an
ongoing state of affairs in the lower courts. For example, he alleged that
“[t]he historic understanding of the common law matters little if we
accept the claims for common law evolution” that we supposedly
advanced.15 But our claims were grounded on a long list of case law that
Huffman almost completely ignored,16 although he did attempt to dismiss
the various categories of background principles we identified in a series
and
of
footnotes
filled
with
undocumented
assertions17
18
mischaracterizations.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at 341–58.
Id. at 368.
Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 12.
Huffman did mention Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972), which
employed a “natural use” doctrine to reject a takings claim, id. at 768, but he contended that the
result was called into question by a South Carolina case, McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 530 S.E.2d 628, 633 (S.C. 2000) (suggesting that the Lucas decision may have overruled
Just sub silentio). Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 9 n.40. We also discussed the
McQueen case, but considered its suggestion to be an outlier in light of case law in a half-dozen
other jurisdictions approving Just, including post-Lucas decisions like that of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 534 (Wis. 1996). Blumm &
Ritchie, supra note 3, at 345–46 & n.158. Apart from McQueen, Huffman ignored this case law,
although he opined that the natural use doctrine “is based on shaky common law.” Huffman,
Background Principles, supra note 7, at 9 n.40. The Just natural use doctrine holds that
transformative land uses, like wetland fills, are not property rights, and therefore their banning
by regulation is not a taking. See Blumm & Richie, supra, at 344–46.
17. For example, Huffman maintained that “the potential of the public trust doctrine is
perceived by many to be almost without limits” without identifying who the “many” might be.
Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 9 n.39. See also supra note 16, on the
undocumented “shaky” nature of the natural use doctrine.
18. For example, Huffman claimed that there is “little in the common law to support the
idea of a wildlife trust,” citing secondary sources and ignoring recent case law recognizing state
ownership of wildlife as a defense to takings claims. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note
7, at 10 n.44; see Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at 353 (discussing New York v. Sour Mountain,
714 N.Y.S.2d 78, 84 (2000), and Sierra Club v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 338, 347 (Ct. App. 1993)); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FPL Group, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 588, 595–600 (Ct. App. 2008) (expressly recognizing the applicability of the public trust
doctrine to wildlife). Huffman also claimed that our Unlikely Legacy article, supra note 3,
“acknowledge[d]” that “it is not plausible to suggest that the doctrine of custom . . . falls within
what Justice Scalia meant by background principles.” Huffman, Background Principles, supra
note 7, at 9 n.42. We acknowledged no such thing. Although we quoted from Justice Scalia’s
dissent from a denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207, 1209 (1994), we maintained that “custom remains a viable threshold
[takings] defense,” discussing Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii County Planning
Commission, 903 P.2d 1264 (Haw. 1995), interpreting Native Hawaiian customary rights to
gather plants and driftwood on undeveloped land, as well as public customary rights recognized
in several other jurisdictions. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at 348–50 (discussing cases
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Perhaps the courts have misunderstood the “background principles”
defense established by Lucas. Perhaps Justice Scalia would be
disappointed in the results of the case law. Huffman suggested that
Justice Scalia intended to “limit judicial discretion” and, relying on a 1911
case involving a cattle drive across Yellowstone National Park, to protect
“economic development consistent with local patterns of use.”19 Although
there is some truth to the notion that law is sensitive to situations in
which certain landowners are singled out for disparate regulatory
treatment,20 Huffman’s suggestion that the common law as a whole is
committed to maintain local use patterns is without foundation. In reality,
the roots of common law property lie in the “do no harm” principle
embodied in the sic utere tuo maxim, which limited development rights
and emphasized interrelationships among landowners and between
landowners and the community.21
At any rate, one would think an attack on the post-Lucas case law
would focus on that case law and explain its faulty reasoning. Instead,
Huffman mounted a normative attack claiming variously that our
discussion of the cases was inconsistent with Scalia’s intent, Roman and
English law, Blackstone, and a libertarian view of American
constitutionalism.22 We question the persuasiveness of this
methodological approach.
II. LIBERTARIAN PROPERTY AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
We believe that Huffman misunderstood our positivist study of the
legacy of Lucas’s background principles defense because of his
ideological blinders. His libertarian opposition to the evolution of
from Texas, Florida, and Idaho). Unlike Huffman, who ignores case law he does not like, we also
cited cases rejecting customary rights. Id. at 350 n.191.
19. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 13 (referring to Scalia’s reliance on
Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911), for the proposition that the common law aims to protect
“essential use[s]” of land, from which Huffman inferred implicit protection for “economic
development consistent with local patterns of use,” a standard he claimed “would appall most
environmentalists and be unfamiliar to many a modern judge”).
20. Justice Scalia suggested that “the fact that other landowners, similarly situated, are
permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant” “ordinarily imports a lack of common law
prohibition.” Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992); see also Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 134 (1978) (rejecting a claim that Grand Central
Terminal was unfairly singled out by an historic preservation ordinance, on the ground that the
city implemented a comprehensive plan that affected over four hundred individual landmarks).
On the implicit equal protection afforded by the takings clause, see Daniel A. Farber, Public
Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT 279 (1992).
21. See generally ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE COMMON GOOD (2003) (arguing against absolute private property rights and maintaining
that community concerns must temper landowner prerogatives, as they did prior to the
nineteenth century, in order to restore land health).
22. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 12 (Scalia’s intent), 10 n.44 (Roman
and English law), 9 n.40 (Blackstone), 10 n.47 (libertarian view of American constitutionalism).
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background principles is a product of his advocacy for an invigorated
application of the takings clause.23 Huffman’s criticism of our explanation
of the fate of the background principles in the lower courts largely
reflects libertarians’ abstract approach to property rights.24
To libertarians like Huffman, property is an idealized abstraction: a
pre-political, natural law concept that cannot be altered by democratic
processes like regulation.25 This largely static view of property is
mistaken; property is actually a product of the state and subject to
different interpretations by the state’s legislature and its courts over
time.26 As Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw declared more than

23. See Huffman’s review of Epstein’s book, supra note 6. Huffman was an enthusiastic
proponent of a takings initiative, known as Measure 37, that the Oregon electorate passed in
2004, promising landowners complete compensation for any reduction in value imposed by any
regulation passed after they or a family member purchased the land. Huffman even successfully
argued the measure’s constitutionality to the Oregon Supreme Court in MacPherson v.
Department of Administrative Services, 130 P.3d 308 (Or. 2006). However, in 2007 the Oregon
legislature referred to the voters, and the voters approved, an amendment to Measure 37—
known as Measure 49—that cut back available compensation substantially. See generally Michael
C. Blumm & Eric Grafe, Enacting Libertarian Property: Oregon’s Measure 37 and Its
Implications, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 279, 360–65 (2007) (discussing Measure 49).
24. On property as an abstraction, see JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE
PROPERTY 52 (1990) (describing ownership of property as “a very abstract idea . . . a correlation
between individual names and objects, such that the decision of the named individual object
about what should be done with the object is taken as socially conclusive. The rules of real or
postulated legal systems assigning rights, liberties, powers, immunities, and liabilities to people
in regard to particular resources amount to conceptions of that abstract concept.”).
25. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1568 & n.72 (2003) (“Property is a ‘natural’—inherent, prepolitical, and
prelegal—right because its pursuit secures . . . natural goods [such as] self-preservation, the
preservation of one's family, and the wealth needed to practice other virtues that require some
minimum of material support.”).
26. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 21, at 37–89 (tracing some significant shifts in property law
resulting from industrialization and westward expansion); see also ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON
PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 29–60 (2007)
(explaining changes in the law of trespass during the early nineteenth century when courts and
legislatures curtailed the public’s right to use unenclosed land); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, ch. 2 (1977) [hereinafter TRANSFORMING
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860] (describing a fundamental shift in American property law during
the early nineteenth century from an absolute dominion model to a more flexible, dynamic
model that supported productive use and development of land); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, ch. 5 (1992) [hereinafter TRANSFORMING
AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960] (discussing the evolution of the concept of relativism in property
law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries leading to dramatic changes in the
judicial oversight of government-regulated rates); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property
Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (cataloging the legal “muddying” over time of caveat emptor,
mortgage law, and the American recording system); Carol M. Rose, Property and
Expropriations: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2000)
(describing three kinds of disruption in property law: “housekeeping” for routine management;
“regulatory” resulting from changes in environment, demography, or technology; and
“extraordinary” during revolution or warfare).
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a century-and-a-half ago, property serves the needs of the community.27
When the interests of the community require, the definition of property
evolves.28 Justice Scalia’s invocation of background principles
acknowledged the reality of evolutionary property rights,29 but Professor
Huffman is committed to a vision of property that is unchanging, or at
least changing very little.30
There is no support for a static view of property in law or in history.31
For example, when the natural flow doctrine of riparian water rights
inhibited the development of grist mills in the early nineteenth century,
the courts changed riparianism to protect only reasonable uses, not
natural flows.32 And when water law moved westward into arid regions,
some courts discarded riparianism entirely.33 The waste doctrine provides
a similar example of more than evolutionary change as, for example,
Justice Joseph Story explained in discarding the English notion that
improvements on leased lands were for the benefit of the landlord.34
There are numerous other examples of revolutionary changes in property

27. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 84–85 (1851) (“[E]very holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use
of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community.”).
28. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 548
(1837) (denying an injunction to a toll-bridge operator to halt construction of a competitor
bridge, refusing to imply that a seventy year old charter conveyed exclusive rights, and stating,
“While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the
community also have rights, and that the happiness and well being of every citizen depends on
their faithful preservation.”).
29. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (”[C]hanged circumstances
or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so”).
30. See Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 20–22 (discounting the role of
public policy in common law judging); see also id. at 21 (“The genius of the common law rests in
its derivation from the customs and practices of everyday life, not in the creativity of judges.”).
31. See supra note 26.
32. See HORWITZ, TRANSFORMING AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, supra note 26, at 34–42
(1977) (discussing the courts’ transformation of riparianism). Huffman does recognize this
change in water law, although he seems to think that the advent of grist mills promoted the
natural flow doctrine. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 25. Actually, the grist
mills encouraged the courts to reject natural flow in favor of reasonable use to allow the dams
accompanying the mills to pond water. See HORWITZ, TRANSFORMING AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860, supra note 26, at 37.
33. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch, 6 Colo. 443 (1882) (abolishing the riparian doctrine
and establishing the so-called Colorado doctrine). In addition to Colorado, eight other western
states completely reject common law riparianism under the Colorado doctrine, including Alaska,
Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET
AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 294 (3d ed. 2000).
34. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 (1829). Justice Story explained that
the English rule of waste was unsatisfactory because America “was a wilderness, and the
universal policy was to procure its cultivation and improvement.” Id. at 145. Thus, the waste
doctrine should “encourage the tenant to devote himself to agriculture, and to favor any
erections which should aid this result . . . .” Id.
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law, many accomplished by legislative changes.35 None was restrained by
the takings clause.36
Although Huffman did grudgingly acknowledge that property law
evolves, he aims to constrain its evolution to judge-made changes that are
“a reflection of customary practices evidenced in precedent.”37 In his
view, the common law is only “a formalization of custom, meant to
evolve as custom evolves.”38 His worry is that common law judges, if
unconstrained by custom, might change the law “in response to abstract
arguments of reasonableness and good public policy.”39 This sort of
judicial lawmaking is taboo because it risks having judges “intrude upon
the legislative function, thereby circumventing whatever constraints the
law, including the constitution, may place on the legislative process,” and
so
compromising
“[i]ndividual
liberties,
including
property
rights . . . when the rule of law is thus ignored by the courts.”40
Huffman’s attempt to resist, or at least severely retard, common law
legal change recalls late nineteenth and early twentieth century Gilded
Age legal formalism, an era in which some judges thought the law was
autonomous and logical, and their role was limited to mechanically
deducing answers.41 This effort to make law a science distinguished
between public and private spheres and created a jurisprudence that
emphasized categorization of concepts, not the consequences of

35. For example, under Thomas Jefferson’s influence, the Virginia legislature abolished
primogeniture and entail; virtually all the new American states soon followed. See Stanley N.
Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 12–18 (1977). A more recent example of revolutionary change in property law is state
pooling and unitization regulations that require surface owners to manage underlying oil and gas
resources in a collective fashion under state supervision. See, e.g., Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279
N.W.2d 564 (Mich. 1979) (adopting the so-called Texas rule); see also HOWARD R. WILLIAMS &
CHARLES J. MEYERS, 6 OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 908–992 (Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer
eds., 2008).
36. See HORWITZ, TRANSFORMING AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, supra note 26, ch. 2
(discussing the transformation of property law in antebellum America); HORWITZ,
TRANSFORMING AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, supra note 26, ch. 5 (discussing the
transformation of property law in the post-Civil War era).
37. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 20.
38. Id. at 23.
39. Id. at 25. In his attachment to custom, Huffman is a disciple of James Coolidge Carter,
a nineteenth-century opponent of the codification movement, who defended common law
judging on grounds that it made no law but instead enforced custom. See HORWITZ,
TRANSFORMING AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, supra note 26, at 118–21. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes initially endorsed custom as a template for common law decision making in his book,
THE COMMON LAW (1881), but gave it up as an unworkable attempt to protect natural law
property rights amid the tumult of late-nineteenth-century social and economic change in his
essay The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). See HORWITZ, TRANSFORMING
AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, supra note 26, at 139–42.
40. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 22.
41. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF
POLITICS IN JUDGING (2009).
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particular decisions.42 The most famous result of formalistic thinking was
the Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York, in which the Supreme
Court struck down a state attempt to regulate workplace practices in
bakeries because it interfered with the rights of employers and employees
to freely contract for labor and therefore violated the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43 Huffman’s
attraction to the categorical thinking of formalistic jurisprudence seems
linked to his call for an aggressive expansion of the takings clause.44
Formalism is apparently appealing to Huffman and libertarians as a
vehicle to limit the judicial discretion they believe to be behind the
evolution of background principles as a categorical defense to takings
claims.45 A particular cause for concern are balancing tests, which
Huffman seems to equate with legal realism,46 even though it is a mistake

42. For an overview of legal formalism, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the
Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988) (arguing that legal phenomena are
objective and immanently knowable); Michael Corrado, The Place of Formalism in Legal
Theory, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1545, 1545 (1992) (contending that law is autonomous from politics,
morality, and sociology); Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Realism,
36 IND. L. REV. 57, 100 (2003) (concluding that legal formalism is not likely to triumph because
American society does not tolerate “apparent injustice” and because legal professionals demand
a more dynamic model); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Formalism and the Red-Hot Knife, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 597, 605–606 (1999) (warning against the rigidity of legal formalism).
43. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). Although Lochner became the eponym
of formalist jurisprudence, the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
protected individuals from state regulation that interfered with employment was evident thirty
years earlier in the dissenting opinion in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 89
(1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
44. Huffman displayed some irritation at our suggestion that the use of background
principles to defeat takings claims at the threshold relieved courts of having to undertake the
difficult balancing required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central,
23 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 171, 172 (2005) (describing the Penn Central framework as
suffering from “chronic vagueness”). Huffman claimed that while we were critical of the
Rehnquist Court’s formalistic Commerce Clause jurisprudence, we celebrated the formalistic
decision making “flowing from [our] perceived categorical defenses” that allowed judges to
avoid the detailed factual inquiry required by Penn Central.” Huffman, Background Principles,
supra note 7, at 17. He charged that “[f]ormalism suits [us] when it operates as categorical
defenses to takings claims, but not when it provides some degree of certainty for individuals
whose property has been taken.” Id. However, we were not celebrating anything; instead, we
were observing the evolution of the background principles defense in the years since Lucas and
the irony that a formalistic-like inquiry into categories of background principles was among the
foremost recent developments in takings law. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at 367–68.
45. See, e.g., Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 16 (attributing to Justice
Scalia’s Lucas opinion an intent to establish “a more formalistic approach in takings
jurisprudence.”).
46. See id. at 21 (arguing that “changing perceptions of the public good” should largely
remain out of the judicial balance); id. at 25 (maintaining that nuisance balancing may reflect
“local custom and practice, but not . . . abstract arguments of reasonableness and good public
policy.”).
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to think that the formalists he admires eschewed judicial balancing.47
Further, there is no small irony in Huffman’s attempt to limit judicial
discretion in the context of background principles at the same time he
employs a revolutionary vision of the takings clause that would be policed
by the judiciary.48
In addition to inaccurately describing post-Lucas case law, the
libertarian property claims advanced by Huffman suffer from a number
of shortcomings beyond their heavy reliance on the judicial activism
associated with the Lochner Era.49 His vision of property largely shielded
from government regulation relies on a perspective of liberty that
protects only landowners, and rejects any duty to future generations.50
Libertarian property also favors intensive, industrial land use over
sensitive uses, sees no intrinsic value in nature, and discounts socially
generated public goods like ecosystem services.51 For all of these reasons,

47. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Bogus Tale About the Legal Formalists (April 2008) (St.
John's Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08–0130), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1123498
(claiming that the received wisdom about the legal formalists—that they believed that law was
“comprehensive, gapless, and logically ordered, and . . . that judges reasoned mechanically or
deductively from this body of law to produce right answers in individual cases”—is false); see
also Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter and the Anti-Classical
Jurisprudence of Anti-Codification, 19 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 149 (2007) (maintaining that those
resisting the codification movement of the nineteenth century defended common law judging not
on the basis of Langdellian formalism, in which judges use a conceptually ordered legal structure
to logically resolve cases from general principles, but instead on the basis of the freedom the
common law system gave to judges to reach fair results on the basis of the particular facts of a
case).
48. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 6; infra note 57 (applauding Epstein’s view of the
Takings Clause); supra note 23 (noting Huffman’s advocacy of revolutionary landowner
compensation scheme in Oregon); Huffman, infra note 189 (celebrating Justice Scalia’s Lucas
opinion as “a small step in the right direction”). On the other hand, for discussions of the
importance of judicial discretion in the evolution of property rights, see Hope M. Babcock, Does
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect Where the Wild Things Are?: Of Beavers, BobO-Links, and Other Things That Go Bump in the Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849, 857–862 (2000)
(explaining how wildlife laws create indeterminacy for property rights); Marc R. Poirier,
Property, Environment, Community, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 43, 53–56 (1997) (arguing that
property is a social construction and that therefore property rights evolve with society); Richard
J. Lazarus, Debunking Environmental Feudalism: Promoting the Individual through the
Collective Pursuit of Environmental Quality, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1739, 1758–1760 (1992)
(describing how environmental concerns will continue to shape property rights in the future).
49. On the Lochner era, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873,
874 (1987) (identifying the lesson of the Lochner era as the “need for judicial deference to
legislative enactments”); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and
Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 609–10 (1996) (concluding that modern
takings doctrine represents a return to the judicial activism of the Lochner era at the expense of
the liberal economic agenda).
50. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 101 (2010).
51. See id. at 102.

BLUMM&RUHLFORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

9/29/2010 1:14 PM

816

[Vol. 37:805

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

the libertarian vision of property is not a fit paradigm for contemporary
America.52
III. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONS AS BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES
One persistent objection that Huffman has levied against our work
was to the inclusion of statutes and constitutional provisions as
background principles.53 This criticism is partly another consequence of
his mistaking our positivist explanation for a normative argument.54
Huffman is again shooting the messenger when he should be analyzing
the courts’ interpretation of the nature of background principles. But he
also asserts that, “while statutory and constitutional law may be relevant
to determining the property rights of a plaintiff, they have nothing to do
with background principles referenced by Justice Scalia.”55 First,
background principles are a chief means of determining the nature and
scope of private property rights. Huffman’s attempt to separate
background principles from the question of the nature of the property
interest is unsuccessful, as even he seems to concede in acknowledging
that “antecedent inquiry into a claimant’s property rights is here to
stay.”56 Because the “antecedent inquiry” includes an examination of
background principles, the inquiry seems unsettling to Huffman.57
52. Huffman makes no attempt to justify his libertarian property in terms of social utility,
and indeed criticizes utilitarianism when used to justify “destroying the property of some to
protect the property of others thought to have more value to the community.” Huffman,
Background Principles, supra note 7, at 10 n.47. He also claims that our description of
background principles “envision[s] a purely utilitarian society in which individual rights may be
sacrificed to [our] perception of the greater common good.” Id. at 29 (referring to us as “latterday common law advocates”). Huffman may assume that aggressive judicial protection of
landowners’ development rights will enhance economic efficiency through wealth maximization,
something often assumed in the law-and-economics literature. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at
29–34; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26 (1974) (discussing the classic
liberal notion that the role of the state should be limited to a “night watchman,” providing
protection from only violence, theft, fraud, and non-enforcement of contracts). For criticism of
law-and-economics’ weak idea of the affirmative obligations that landowners owe to their
communities, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 753–57 (2009) (arguing that a social obligation norm provides a
better explanation of American property law, and a morally superior one, to law-and-economics
theory).
53. See, e.g., Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 11 (“And how is it that
statutes and constitutions, whether preexisting or not, qualify as background principles of the
common law in a legal system that has long distinguished the common law from statutory and
constitutional law?”); id. at 18 (“Yet the background principles are supposed to derive from the
common law.”).
54. See supra Part I.
55. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 10 n.46.
56. Id. at 14.
57. Huffman stated that our recognition that background principles were a fundamental
part of the “antecedent inquiry” that Justice Scalia called for was part of an argument that the
Lucas decision established “an entirely new preemptive stage in takings analysis,” which he
claimed “read[s] more into [the decision] than is there.” Id. Yet he proceeded to endorse
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Second, while Justice Scalia seemed to emphasize common law
background principles, the only law he aimed to exclude from
background principles were “newly legislated or decreed” requirements.58
That statement obviously does not exclude all statutes or constitutional
provisions. Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lucas made
clear that he, at least, viewed common law nuisance as “too narrow a
confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and
interdependent society,” suggesting that states should be able to enact
“new regulatory initiative[s] in response to changing conditions.”59
Certainly Justice Kennedy, whose opinion is often determinative in cases
affecting the environment, would not reject all statutes as background
principles.60
Third, as we pointed out in our earlier study, a number of courts
have interpreted background principles to include statutes and
constitutional provisions.61 Professor Huffman ignored these cases. It is
true that in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion rejected the idea that all statutes enacted prior to a landowner’s
acquisition of title qualified as background principles.62 But, as we
explained, the opinion also stated that development rights were subject to
“valid zoning and land-use restrictions,”63 a position subsequently
endorsed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas in
Professor Epstein’s four-part test to determine whether a taking has occurred, the first element
of which is: “[I]s there a taking?” Id. at 15 (citing EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 31). Although
Huffman did recognize that background principles were relevant to this initial factor, he then
added a puzzling statement: “Background principles are not an exception to the requirement of
compensation where a taking has in fact occurred.” Id. But because background principles help
determine the nature of private property, a court cannot determine whether a taking has in fact
occurred without engaging in a “logically antecedent inquiry” employing such principles. See
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
58. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
59. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy also stated that in deciding takings
claims, courts “must consider all reasonable expectations whatever their source.” Id.
60. See Michael C. Blumm & Sherry Bosse, Justice Kennedy and the Environment:
Property, States’ Rights, and a Persistent Search for Nexus, 82 WASH. L. REV. 667 (2007).
61. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at 354–60. New York’s highest court concluded
that a wetlands protection statute defeated takings claims in Gazza v. New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997); federal courts found
statutory limitations contained in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act to be background principles in American
Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and Reeves v United States,
54 Fed. Cl. 652 (2002), respectively.
62. 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (discussed in Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at 356).
63. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627 (discussed in Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at 356).
Huffman erroneously claims that Palazzolo rejected the idea of statutory background principles.
Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 10 n.46. In fact the Court held only that
statutes that existed prior to a landowner’s acquisition were not categorically exempted from
takings claims by virtue of the so-called “notice rule.” See Michael C. Blumm, Palazzolo and the
Decline of Justice Scalia’s Categorical Takings Doctrine, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 137, 143–
47 (2002).
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their dissent in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency.64 Thus, there is widespread agreement among the
current justices that at least some statutes and regulations are
background principles. Huffman pretended this agreement did not exist.
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, lower courts have found
numerous statutes and regulations to be background principles, including
provisions of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.65 Recent
decisions have concluded that several local zoning ordinances,66 as well as
federal reinsurance requirements,67 were background principles that
defeated takings claims. Similarly, the Hawaiian Court of Appeals upheld
a statute denying landowners rights to future accretions, on the ground
that the landowners had no right to future accretions at common law.68
And the Texas Court of Appeals rejected landowners’ claims that the
state took their property by ordered removal of their beach houses under
the Open Beaches Act because the public easement the statute
recognized provided merely “a method of enforcing [the] easement” that
the public had acquired under the common law doctrine of implied
dedication.69 The boundaries of the statutory background principles
defense may not be entirely clear,70 but to suggest, as Huffman does, that
64. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
352 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that “zoning and
permit regimes are a longstanding feature of state property law,” specifically referencing the
New York City zoning ordinance of 1916. Id. We earlier observed that statutes antedating the
1916 zoning ordinance included statutes and regulations protecting wetlands and wildlife
conservation. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at 358.
65. See Reeves v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 652, 671–72 (2002); American Pelagic Fishing
Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Both cases were discussed in
Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at 356–57.
66. See Wiebbecke v. Benton County Bd. of Supervisors, No. 06-1672, 2008 WL 2746342, at
*4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 16, 2008) (upholding a zoning ordinance in effect when the landowner
purchased the property as a background principle); E. First St. v. Bd. of Adjustments, 2008 WL
2567080, at *5 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that a 1979 zoning ordinance was a background
principle); Mutschler v. City of Phoenix, 129 P.3d 71, 77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that
conduct prohibited by a city ordinance—operation of live sex clubs—could have been prohibited
as a common-law nuisance).
67. See Acceptance Ins. Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849, 857 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding
that the federal regulatory regime governing the Department of Agriculture's reinsurance of
private crop insurance companies constituted background principles sufficient to defeat a takings
claim).
68. See Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State, 2009 WL 5127980, at *20 (Haw. Ct. App.
2009). The court did rule that the statute’s effect on existing accretions worked a taking. Id. at
*22.
69. Brannan v. Texas, 2010 WL 375921, at *21 (Tex. App. 2010).
70. It may be, for example, that apart from the zoning and land-use regulations mentioned
by Justice Kennedy in his Palazzolo opinion, 533 U.S. at 627, discussed supra text accompanying
note 62, statutory background principles only prohibit conduct that could have been prohibited
by common law. See supra notes 66–67 (noting several recent decisions relying on statutory and
regulatory background principles).
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background principles are exclusively common law-derived is clearly
erroneous.
IV. NUISANCE AND WETLANDS—A CONUNDRUM FOR
LIBERTARIAN PROPERTY
Wetlands and the common law of nuisance provide an apt case study
for applying the foregoing to Huffman’s conception of background
principles and the historical details of common law. In Making Nuisance
Ecological, we argued that public and private nuisance law could
integrate injury to flows of “ecosystem services” as a harm in some cases
remediable through nuisance claims. Ecosystem services are the
economic benefits humans derive from ecosystem structures and
processes that form what might be thought of as natural capital.71
Building on work dating back to the 1970s,72 ecologists and economists
have been forging the theory and application of the ecosystem services

71. Ecosystem services are economically valuable benefits humans derive from ecological
resources either directly, such as storm surge mitigation provided by coastal dunes and marshes,
or indirectly, such as nutrient cycling that supports crop production. Natural capital consists of
the ecological resources that produce these service values, such as forests, riparian habitat, and
wetlands. Ecosystem services flow from natural capital to human communities in four streams:
(1) provisioning services are commodities such as food, wood, fiber, and water; (2) regulating
services moderate or control environmental conditions, such as flood control by wetlands, water
purification by aquifers, and carbon sequestration by forests; (3) cultural services include
recreation, education, and aesthetics; and (4) supporting services, such as nutrient cycling, soil
formation, and primary production, make the other three service streams possible. For
comprehensive descriptions of these concepts, see MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,
ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS (2005), available at http://www.
millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf; NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL
DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) [hereinafter NATURE’S
SERVICES]; Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997). For coverage of the emergence of the ecosystem services
concept in law and policy, see J.B. RUHL, STEVEN E. KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE
LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007) [hereinafter LAW AND POLICY]; J.B. Ruhl
& James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 157 (2007) [hereinafter Ruhl & Salzman, Law and Policy Beginnings]; James
Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 133 (2006).
72. Mooney and Ehrlich trace references to “services” in connection with ecosystems as far
back as 1970. See Harold A. Mooney & Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecosystem Services: A Fragmentary
History, in NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 11, 14
(Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997). Walter Westman was the first to attempt to assign numbers to the
values of what he called “nature’s services,” relying on the postulated technology costs of
replacing or repairing impaired ecosystem functions. See Walter E. Westman, How Much Are
Nature’s Services Worth?, 197 SCIENCE 960 (1977). Soon thereafter, in a little-noticed article,
Edward Farnsworth et al. outlined one of the earliest comprehensive frameworks for considering
the value of services provided by natural ecosystems. See Edward G Farnsworth et al., The Value
of Natural Ecosystems: An Economic and Ecological Framework, 8 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 275
(1981).
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concept since the early 1990s,73 but only in the past few years has the
concept begun to register explicitly in any meaningful way in law.74
One such example, however, is found in Palazzolo v. State,75 in which
a Rhode Island trial court considered the regulatory takings claim the
United States Supreme Court left dangling in Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island.76 The Supreme Court had rejected the claim that state agency
denial of a permit to fill and develop a marsh area adjacent to a pond
constituted a categorical taking of property under Lucas, on the ground
that the agency allowed Palazzolo to develop some of his parcel, leaving
it to the state courts initially to decide whether the permit denial was a
regulatory taking. On remand, the state trial court dismissed the action,
reasoning that Lucas “establish[ed] public nuisance as a preclusive
defense to takings claims,”77 and finding that “clear and convincing
evidence demonstrates that Palazzolo’s development would constitute a
public nuisance.”78 As the court explained:
Palazzolo’s proposed development has been shown to have significant
and predictable negative effects on Winnapaug Pond and the adjacent
salt water marsh. The State has presented evidence as to various
effects that the development will have including increasing nitrogen
levels in the pond, both by reason of the nitrogen produced by the
attendant residential septic systems, and by the reduced marsh area
which actually filters and cleans runoff. This Court finds that the
effects of increased nitrogen levels constitute a predictable
(anticipatory) nuisance which would almost certainly result in an
ecological disaster to the pond.79
In our prior work, we pointed to Palazzolo as a reasonable, logical
application of Justice Scalia’s background principles doctrine, one which
demonstrates that courts may account for injury to ecosystem services in
public nuisance law without violating, or even stretching, any of its
doctrinal integrity.80 We also showed how the same logic of the common
law could be mapped onto the doctrine of private nuisance as well.81
In Beware of Greens, Huffman launches a barrage of salvos at
Making Nuisance Ecological, none of which hit the mark, and several of
which backfire on Huffman’s claims. His response advances on three
73. See Ruhl & Salzman, Law and Policy Beginnings, supra note 71, at 158–61 (2007);
Harold A Mooney and Paul R. Erlich, Ecosystem Services: A Fragmentary History, in NATURE’S
SERVICES, supra note 71, at 11.
74. See LAW AND POLICY, supra note 71, at 127–57; Ruhl & Salzman, Law and Policy
Beginnings, supra note 71, at 163–64.
75. Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88–0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005).
76. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
77. Palazzolo v. State, 2005 WL 1645974, at *5.
78. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. See Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, supra note 9, at 762–63.
81. Id. at 765–75.
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fronts. First, he casts us as “reborn common law faithful”82 whose
underlying purpose is one of “blatant and cynical opportunism.”83 Our
crime? Huffman alleges that we are hijacking the common law in order to
roll a Trojan horse filled with background principles into the fortress of
libertarian property.84 As he puts it, our purported “renewed interest in
the common law . . . is driven by a desire to insulate environmental
regulation from the takings clause.”85 This argument seems designed to
provide evidence of our cynicism, perhaps even to suggest our interest in
the common law is not genuine. Of course, when we became interested in
the common law has nothing to do with the merits of how we describe the
common law. In any event, well before Background Principles and
Making Nuisance Ecological we had expressed broad interest in many of
the attributes of the common law. We did not just recently discover it to
aggravate libertarian property’s conception of the common law’s role in
society.86
Second, putting motives aside, he suggests that we “evidenc[e] very
little appreciation for the common law as an institution for the allocation
of scarce resources.”87 Although he does not connect the dots so clearly,
presumably he must believe that accounting for the economic value of
ecosystem services in legal regimes, including the common law, would not
improve resource allocation decisions. We know of no economic analysis
of ecosystem services consistent with that view.88
Third, even if accounting for ecosystem services would effectuate
wise allocation of scarce resources, Huffman argues that our position, and
implicitly also the court’s ruling in Palazzolo, should be rejected as a
“radical disruption of the settled expectations that the common law exists
to protect.”89 In his view, we represent not “just another logical step in
the long history of common law evolution [but] an unjustifiable break
with the reasonable expectations created by the common law itself.”90
According to Huffman, decisions like Palazzolo commit the sin of what
he refers to as “supply side” legal change,91 change based on the court’s
own preferences and imposed “top down”92 through judicial “direct
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Huffman, Beware of Greens, supra note 7, at 816.
Id. at 859.
See id. at 836–40.
Id. at 814.
See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the
Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407,
1469–72 (1996) (describing the common law as a complex adaptive system).
87. Huffman, Beware of Greens, supra note 7, at 814.
88. See RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, supra note 71, at
57–83 (surveying the economic literature on ecosystem services).
89. Huffman, Beware of Greens, supra note 7, at 814.
90. Id. at 839–40.
91. Id. at 842.
92. Id. at 851.
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expansion of public nuisance law,”93 thus jarringly upsetting property
owner expectations reflected in “accepted practice and custom”94 and
long settled through the slow “bottom up”95 evolution of the common law
driven by the so-called “demand side”96 goal of efficiency.97
The trouble with Huffman’s trilogy of objections is that he launches
the assault through a purely normative and entirely ahistorical account of
the record of the common law of nuisance and of wetlands practice and
custom. He observes that American common law began with English
common law,98 that American courts have adapted the common law
through “acceptance and confirmation of established practices and
customs,”99 and that in this adaptation process “the common law follows,
not leads, . . . [as] it is for the legislature and the executive, not the courts,
to try their hands at leading society.”100 We couldn’t agree more.
Huffman, however, never puts his three objections to Making Nuisance
Ecological under the microscope of these truths by examining the record
of the common law of nuisance and the practices and customs
surrounding wetlands.
Because the record on both matters is rather well documented, we
did not recount its expansive and rich context in Making Nuisance
Ecological. But now presented with Huffman’s normative revisionist
account, we feel compelled to explain, with the aid of work from three
other legal scholars, that: (1) English common law recognized and
protected what today we call the ecosystem service values of wetlands;
(2) nineteenth-century American common law courts adapted the
English common law of nuisance to the demands of American
agricultural settlement policy by recasting wetlands as nuisances precisely
to roll the first Trojan horse of background principles into the libertarian
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 830.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 848.
Id. at 842. Huffman borrows the “supply side” versus “demand side” model of the
common law from Douglas G. Whitman, Evolution of the Common Law and the Emergence of
Compromise, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 753, 775–76 (2000). Huffman does not acknowledge in Beware
of Greens that Making Nuisance Ecological rejects, as inconsistent with the evolutionary norms
of the common law, normative “supply side” arguments other scholars have made for
broadening nuisance law to encompass a litany of ecological harms. See Ruhl, Making Nuisance
Ecological, supra note 9, at 783–84.
97. Huffman includes a fourth objection of sorts in asserting that, even if the common law
has legitimately evolved as suggested in Making Nuisance Ecological, the courts would be
committing “judicial takings” by applying the evolved law of nuisance to actual land use
disputes. See Huffman, Beware of Greens, supra note 7, at 852–58. As it is not directly related to
the proper conception of the scope of the background principles doctrine, but rather with the
consequences of the doctrine’s implementation by courts, we deal with this challenge infra in
Part IV.E.
98. See id. at 860.
99. Id. at 837.
100. Id. at 847.
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property fortress; (3) the reformed view of wetlands and their ecosystem
services has been percolating “bottom up” from new knowledge, public
perception, legislative initiative, and community practice and custom for
at least the past half-century; and (4) modern American courts are
beginning to incorporate the reformed and now fully entrenched customs
and practices of wetlands protection into the common law of nuisance.
In other words, all three legs of Huffman’s assault on Making
Nuisance Ecological have fallen off the libertarian property stool. What
he says is supposed to happen under the common law has in fact
happened, and what he says in fact happened amounts to no more than
the fantasy of libertarian property. At bottom, Huffman has nothing to
stand on but his normative conception of what the common law should
be, not what it is or has been. His complaint, therefore, is not with us and
our positivist, historically accurate, economically efficient application of
the background principles doctrine; it is with Justice Scalia, the
background principles doctrine’s modern-day inventor, despite being a
champion of libertarian property. The following subparts expound on the
historical chain of case law underlying modern courts’ background
principles analysis of wetlands.
A.

Wetlands in the English Common Law

Huffman claims that “the default rule for most of American and
English history has favored resource development, often in the name of
natural use of land and resources.”101 As we show in Part IV.B, this
orientation was unquestionably true of nineteenth-century American
common law with respect to wetlands. But the English common law is a
much more complex story, one which puts the first chink in Huffman’s
libertarian property armor.
As Professor Fred Bosselman has meticulously detailed, the
importance of common wetlands, known as the great fens, to the social
and economic life of England through the seventeenth century had a
profound impact on the development of the common law.102 Through the
sixteenth century, “the modern idea of land development—the changing
of a land’s use to something other than the uses associated with an
agricultural economy—was uncommon.”103 To the extent there was
development, it was associated with roads and waterways for
transportation, which was completely under the control of the Crown.104

101. Id. at 839.
102. See Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law,
15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (1996). Our brief summary of Bosselman’s work hardly does justice to
its sweeping historical scope and probing detail.
103. Id. at 288.
104. See id. at 288–94.
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Villagers generally had individual rights to use some land adjoining
marshes and common rights in larger tracts of peatlands.105 To be sure,
the fens were used for commercial activity, but “only . . . for those
economic activities which could be practiced perpetually without
depleting the resource—activities which we would now call
‘sustainable.’”106 The sustained ecological integrity of the marshes,
particularly of water levels, was of vital economic importance,107 and
disputes arose routinely between villages and individuals over the
obligation to protect wetlands from flooding or drying out.108
Over time, the “fen people” developed informal codes “that
governed economic activities in the wetlands.”109 According to
Bosselman,
The common law courts validated these wetland codes because they
codified local customs exercised continuously since before 1189, and
because they were sufficiently consistent with other customs, certain
and compulsory, to justify their enforcement. Local customs meeting
these tests were enforceable in the courts, and the codes served
merely to memorialize such customs.110
The writ of ad quod damnum thus emerged as a way for the Crown,
through the common law courts, to approve or prohibit proposed
significant changes to the wetland landscape. Through this writ
procedure, “the common law provided a means for evaluating proposed
development activities in wetlands in terms of their effects on the fens
and the fen people, and for allocating the costs and benefits of such
development in an equitable manner.”111 Bosselman concludes that the
“English common law contributed to the maintenance of a sustainable
wetland economy,” principally by enforcing “a pattern of interrelated
ownership interests promoting continuation of existing patterns of
wetland ownership and use . . . [and] by using the doctrine of custom to
enforce regulatory codes developed and endorsed by the wetland users
themselves.”112
The English common law of wetlands and the fen culture remained
intact until the seventeenth century, “when new technology and a new

105. See id. at 279.
106. Id. at 280. “Examples of such activities included grazing, gathering, fowling and
fishing.” Id. Taking of wood for fire was allowed as a right of pasture, but there was no right to
take wood for construction purposes. See id.
107. See id. at 281.
108. See id. at 281–82.
109. See id. at 283.
110. Id. These customary rules focused primarily on who could exploit the wetland, when,
and to what extent. See id. A major concern in this regard went to water levels in wetlands and
obligations to avoid flooding and drying out. See id. at 281–82.
111. Id. at 337.
112. Id.
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political climate combined to increase the amount of wetland drainage
dramatically.”113 With the growth of the enclosure movement and the
emergence of the landed class in control of Parliament, the fens were
drained and the fen culture dismantled, leading to much social turmoil
through the 1600s.114 As Bosselman sums up:
For a thousand years, the English wetlands were a commons in which
small-scale flood protection was combined with sustainable use of
natural wetland products. Parliament then extinguished the rights of
wetland users and redistributed those rights to the landed magnates in
conjunction with large scale drainage projects. As a result of the
gradual enclosure and drainage of wetlands, the common law of
wetlands fell into disuse. Fewer and fewer wetlands existed, and those
that remained often became part of the fee simple estate of a large
land owner.115
So we can now revisit Huffman’s claim that “the default rule for
most of . . . English history has favored resource development, often in
the name of natural use of land and resources.”116 He is accurate only if
one begins the history of English common law in 1600, lopping off the
prior 1000 years of uninterrupted social use and, eventually, common law
protection of intact, ecologically functional wetlands. It is ironic that
Huffman, who chastises us for failing to give due respect to settled
expectations of property owners, seems to care little about the relatively
rapid and massive social dislocation of the fen people and their
millennium-scale settled expectations at the hands of the land magnates
using their control of Parliament to transform the common law. We
discuss below other examples of Huffman’s selective concern for whose
ox is being gored.
True enough, however, is that American courts inherited the
common law of England as it stood at the close of the eighteenth century,
not as it existed during the time of the great fens. But as the next section
shows, nineteenth-century American courts were quick to “adapt” the
English common law in a “supply side” manner to accomplish what
Huffman fears most about Making Nuisance Ecological, except that their
Trojan horse worked to a different end.
B.

The First Trojan Horse—American Nineteenth-Century
Common Law in Pursuit of Drainage

We now turn to Huffman’s claim that “the default rule for most of
American . . . history has favored resource development, often in the

113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 297.
See id. at 297–303.
Id. at 303.
Huffman, Beware of Greens, supra note 7, at 839 (emphasis added).
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name of natural use of land and resources.”117 Certainly if one were to
examine in isolation the nineteenth-century American common law
courts, one would have to agree. American judges made the English
courts look like relative lightweights by systematically building into the
common law what Professor John Sprankling describes as an
“antiwilderness bias.”118 As Bosselman did for the English common law,
Sprankling’s research comprehensively traces the development of
American jurisprudence on basic property doctrine, including nuisance.
There are some chapters of that history which Huffman has overlooked.
Sprankling’s thesis is that “the abundance of wilderness land in the
young United States substantially affected the nineteenth-century
evolution of American property law . . . [and] that an instrumentalist
judiciary modified English property law to encourage agrarian
development, and thus promote the destruction, of privately-owned
American wilderness.”119 Nuisance is among the six property law
doctrines Sprankling advances for evidence of this judicial transformation
of the common law. For example, American courts gradually replaced the
English harm-based test for nuisance with “a more flexible approach . . .
under which only an unreasonable land use was deemed a nuisance,” and
they also “increasingly considered the nature of the locality.”120 Under
this approach, combined with the relentless national pursuit of agrarian
development, the courts treated wilderness as having little value, meaning
“conduct was less likely to be enjoined as a nuisance if it occurred in a
wilderness area than another, more developed, locality.”121 Moreover, as
American courts relaxed the English rule of enjoining nuisances by
allowing compensatory damages as a remedy, “nuisance proved a useless
doctrine to owners of wilderness land . . . [b]ecause the market values
wilderness land solely in terms of its potential for future exploitative
use.”122 The alteration of wilderness thus had no significant negative
impact on value, resulting in no meaningful damages remedy.123
Sprankling offered many cases from the nineteenth century as
examples of this judicial evolution of the common law of nuisance, but
the most revealing set of examples for our purposes is found in Professor
John Nagle’s history of the status of wetlands in the American common
law.124 Nagle examines numerous examples of judicial opinions from the
117. Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
118. See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 519 (1996).
119. Id. at 521.
120. Id. at 554.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 556.
123. See id.
124. See John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to Wetlands Regulation to Ecological
Nuisances to Environmental Ethics, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 787 (2008).
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nineteenth century in which courts describe wetlands in terms that would
strike any American today as laughable—were the courts not so deadly
serious. After recounting numerous examples in which state courts
pronounced an unfettered property right to drain and fill wetlands at
will,125 Nagle adds that “[m]ost famously, the United States Supreme
Court said that ‘if there is any fact which may be supposed to be known
by everybody, and therefore by courts, it is that swamps and stagnant
waters are the cause of malarial and malignant fevers, and that the police
power is never more legitimately exercised than in removing such
nuisances.’”126 The nineteenth-century American courts thus had taken
the English common law they inherited and “adapted” it to the point of
casting wetlands as stark nuisances.
To his credit, Huffman does not go so far as to endorse the view that
wetlands are, as a matter of judicial notice, nuisances. Yet he praises the
nineteenth-century judicial common law experience as an example of the
“bottom up” evolution of common law in which the legislature leads the
courts, claiming that “the 19th century common law courts were not top
down policy makers.”127 Indeed, the Swamp Act of 1849, by which
Congress transferred to Louisiana “the whole of those swamp and
overflowed lands, which may be found unfit for cultivation,”128 is one
example of Congress leading on the theme of wetlands as nuisances.
While Nagle points to this legislation and a series of federal and state
laws like it to illustrate the uninformed view of wetlands in that era,129
Huffman might have used them as evidence that the courts were
following the legislative lead.
Fair enough, but Huffman does not mention those legislative
initiatives in Beware of Greens, perhaps because if he did he would have
to account for the fact that beginning a century later Congress reversed
its prior policy and began legislating a long lineage of environmental
protection laws, including wetland conservation laws. That legislative
lead began well before the Palazzolo opinion we applauded in Making
Nuisance Ecological, and which Huffman condemned in Beware of
Greens. If the nineteenth-century courts were “bottom up,” Professor
Huffman, why not also the Palazzolo court and others that might follow
in its footsteps? More on that nagging detail below, for the story about
the nineteenth century only gets more interesting, and doubly
problematic for Huffman.
Another historical event Huffman leaves out of his version of the
nineteenth century is that the courts were not content to call wetlands
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See id. at 790–91.
Id. at 791–92 (quoting Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900)).
See Huffman, Beware of Greens, supra note 7, at 848.
Swamp Act, § 1, 9 Stat. 352, 352 (1849).
Nagle, supra note 124, at 792–94.
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nuisances and leave it at that. As Nagle explains, the nineteenth-century
courts “relied upon nuisance law to avoid the Fifth Amendment’s duty to
pay just compensation to landowners whose property was subjected to
legislatively mandated swamp drainage activities.”130 As the Swamp Act
and its progeny moved forward across the landscape,
landowners sought compensation from the government for various
harms associated with the draining of their lands. Those takings
claims failed. The courts also upheld statutes requiring the adjacent
property owners to pay the costs of draining the swamps because
those owners would become the greatest beneficiaries of the
reclaimed lands. According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, “to
protect the public health and prevent public nuisances, this legislative
interference with private property may be justified, and the
assessment to cover the cost of such work may properly be made on
the lands proportionately benefitted and improved thereby.”131
Can it be that Huffman’s “bottom up” nineteenth-century courts, which
he holds out as the exemplar of common law evolution, not only altered
the law of nuisance but then precluded takings claims on the ground of
none other than the newly defined background principles? The practice
sounds familiar to us: that is precisely what the Palazzolo court did. Yet
we find no explanation from Huffman in Beware of Greens for why the
nineteenth-century courts are to be applauded for such practices, but
when we applaud the modern courts for doing the same, we are being
radical, top down, cynical, and opportunistic.
If Huffman was aware of what Nagle reveals about the nineteenthcentury courts, he didn’t say so in Beware of Greens. Perhaps he attempts
to dodge this inherent inconsistency indirectly through his suggestion that
Palazzolo and Making Nuisance Ecological rest on a “relatively
newfound concern for ecosystem services coming at roughly the same
time as Justice Scalia’s Lucas opinion.”132 We turn to that fiction in the
next section.
C.

The American Reformation of Wetland Practices and Customs

We trust that Huffman does not expect any modern court to adhere
to the notion that wetlands should be drained because they are public
nuisances. Yet rejecting that nineteenth-century wisdom does not require
the common law of the twenty-first century to characterize draining of a
wetland as a nuisance. For Huffman, that switch would necessitate the
common law evolving from the “bottom up” with social customs and

130. Id. at 796.
131. Id. at 795–96 (quoting Donnelly v. Decker, 17 N.W. 389, 393 (1883), and providing
additional examples).
132. Huffman, Beware of Greens, supra note 7, at 817.
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practices and legislative initiatives in the lead. Huffman insists that this
has not happened, that Palazzolo and Making Nuisance Ecological
represent some out of the blue, wild-eyed idea that wetlands are in fact
economically valuable and that their destruction can in fact injure private
property owners and the public at large.
What, exactly, does Huffman make of the last sixty years of our
nation’s social and policy history of environmental conservation? How
does he incorporate the factual record into his model of properly paced
and framed evolution of the common law? If he is asking for “bottom up”
evolution led by social customs and practices and legislative initiatives,
we don’t have to work very hard to spell it out for him. As Professors
Douglas Williams and Kim Connolly explain:
[D]uring the early decades of the twentieth century, concern about
the effects of wetland losses, particularly on migratory waterfowl,
began to brew and eventually gained national prominence. With the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, the Migratory Bird Conservation
Act of 1929, and the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act of 1934, the
concern evolved into a national policy somewhat at odds with other
federal policies, particularly the USDA’s promotion of wetlands
drainage and conversion to agricultural production.133
From there, Williams and Connolly walk readers step by step through the
building history of federal administrative and legislative wetland
conservation initiatives leading to the passage of the Clean Water Act in
1972, from which federal wetlands conservation and regulation policy
emanates to this day.134 In 1988, then-presidential candidate George H.W.
Bush adopted the “no net loss” of wetlands policy, which has remained
the cornerstone of executive wetlands policy in every administration
since.135 Congress and the executive were acting in sync with the social
times.
Likewise, the science and economics of ecosystem services are not
newfound wisdom. As explained above, they began in nascent form in
1970 and have progressed quickly to produce a vast literature and
research agenda.136 Wetlands, indeed, are the leading star of the cast of
ecosystem services given their prodigious output of values for humans,
including protection and enhancement of human property through flood
mitigation, groundwater recharge, water filtration, and sediment
133. Douglas R. Williams & Kim Dana Connolly, Federal Wetlands Regulation: An
Overview, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404, at 3–4 (Kim Dana
Connolly et al. eds., 2005).
134. See id. at 4–5.
135. See Department of Defense and Environmental Protection Agency, Compensatory
Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19594, 19594 (Apr. 10, 2008)
(describing “no net loss” of wetlands as a longstanding national goal guiding federal policy).
136. See supra notes 71–73. For a more in-depth survey of the science and economics of
ecosystem services, see LAW AND POLICY, supra note 71, at 15–83.
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capture.137 The knowledge amassed in the past forty years now composes
an irrefutable body of evidence regarding the values wetlands provide to
humans.
D.

The Modern Courts Follow the Lead

So where does this history of custom, social norms, legislation,
science, and economics leave Huffman in his assault on decisions like
Palazzolo and analyses of common law evolution like Making Nuisance
Ecological? Huffman must concede that judges did not write Silent
Spring, the Clean Water Act, or the no net loss policy. Palazzolo and
Making Nuisance Ecological, written ninety years after the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, twenty-five years after the Clean Water Act, and twenty
years after the no net loss policy, are simply putting the common law in
line with well-entrenched social custom and practices, legislative
initiatives, scientific knowledge, and economic theory. Are we and the
courts acting too fast for Huffman? No faster, it seems, than his heroes
the nineteenth-century courts acted to tilt American common law toward
the anti-wilderness bias. Must tilting back in favor of the environment
move more slowly? And what would Huffman have today’s courts do if
not to incorporate the new knowledge of ecosystem services and changed
circumstances of society and legislation? Surely he does not expect the
courts to cling to patently false ideas about what wetlands are. Short of
that, does he expect the courts to close their eyes and ears to the factual
record, pretending wetlands and their ecosystem services don’t exist? Is
that what Huffman’s version of the common law demands?
Huffman does not go there, for that would be a preposterous
constraint to place on the courts. Instead, his entire assault on Making
Nuisance Ecological depends on convincing others that courts like the
Rhode Island court in Palazzolo are jumping the gun and engaging in
“top-down” legislating of new policy, when in fact no such conception of
history can be put together from the factual record.
Nuisance law is never simple, nor should it be. It is inconsistent with
the history of nuisance doctrine, therefore, for Huffman to argue that the
thesis of Making Nuisance Ecological “is a nonstarter because the idea of
private rights in ecosystem services is unworkable.”138 If fear of
complexity and indeterminacy were enough to shut the door on the
evolution of nuisance doctrine, there would be no nuisance doctrine. The
modern courts finally get it, plain and simple, and it is high time that they
did. It is up to them to work out the details.

137. See Sandra Postel & Stephen Carpenter, Freshwater Ecosystem Services, in NATURE’S
SERVICES, supra note 71, at 195–211.
138. Huffman, Beware of Greens, supra note 7, at 833.
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Huffman’s Last Stand

At the end of Beware of Greens, Huffman offers his Plan B—the
specter of “judicial takings.”139 His idea is that the courts would commit a
taking when declaring filling of wetlands a nuisance if they have not
consistently declared as much in the past, by which we assume he means
time immemorial. We concede, as the historical record requires, that the
nineteenth-century courts would have scoffed at our proposal as
uproariously as almost everyone today dismisses their views on wetlands.
Notably, however, Huffman does not suggest that nineteenth-century
courts were committing “judicial takings” when they denied takings
claims by landowners injured as a result of wetland draining, despite the
injuries inflicted on neighboring landowners and the public. Nor does
Huffman suggest that the fen people could have claimed “judicial taking”
when the courts and Parliament dismantled their wetlands and way of
life.
Even Huffman must concede that the academic theory of judicial
takings remains just that—a theory.140 Its currency in jurisprudence is also
limited, beginning with Justice Stewart’s suggestion, in a concurring
opinion, that when a state court imposes a “sudden change in state law”
of property it could expose the state to a takings claim,141 a concept
recently endorsed by four Justices in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.
v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection.142 Yet, even assuming
the Supreme Court someday were to adopt that view as the law of the
land, as explained above, it would not apply to the ecological nuisance
claim proposed in Making Nuisance Ecological and enforced in
Palazzolo, because there was no sudden change in the law. As shown
above, the courts have arrived at this point through precisely the
evolutionary process Huffman demands. Unless Huffman is suggesting
that all evolutionary steps in the common law process are exposed to
judicial takings claims, he needs to explain why today’s evolution should
be so exposed but the nineteenth century’s evolution is not.
That observation leads us to our final response to Huffman’s assault
on Making Nuisance Ecological. The only way we can reconcile all of the

139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at 852–58.
See id. at 857.
See id. at 856 (quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1967)).
No. 08-1151 (U.S. June 17, 2010). The case arose out of the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision in Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 2008),
cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2792 (2009) (No. 08-1151), in which the court found a state beach
renourishment statute that fixed property boundaries for littoral property owners did not
constitute a taking of property without just compensation. Id. at 1121. For an in-depth discussion
of the case, which is outside the scope of this Article, see Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches,
Boundaries and SOBs, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1483348 (follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink).
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inconsistencies and omissions in Huffman’s account—including his failure
to account for the English common law of the fens, the nineteenthcentury American courts’ transformation of the common law, and the
same courts’ invention of the first Trojan horse—is to infer that he
believes the evolution of the common law of nuisance is a one-way
ratchet. It is well oiled and works without any libertarian property
objection when it evolves to favor more unfettered rights to exploit
property at the expense of the environment, but it locks against any
evolutionary step in the other direction. If that is Huffman’s view of the
common law, his theory of common law’s evolution flows from an
entirely normative perspective and runs at odds with what he purports in
Beware of Greens to be an historically based model. History holds
relevance for Huffman only, it seems, if it is consistent with the world as
seen through the lens of libertarian property.
By contrast, for these purposes we make absolutely no normative
claim about the common law. We accept that the nineteenth-century
courts, given their time, were acting within the bounds of common law
evolution. We merely suggest that when courts in modern times realize
their counterparts from the past were factually wrong—and in this case
not merely a little wrong, but indisputably, absolutely wrong—it is within
the power, even the duty, of the common law to correct course,
particularly when the correction is made decades after every other
institution in society has already corrected course. If Huffman, as a
representative of libertarian property and free market environmentalism,
believes that our position “evidences not a scintilla of confidence in the
common law process” and “rather . . . is blatant and cynical
opportunism,”143 then he has shown his true colors. As the next Part
shows, he has repeatedly done so by discussing areas well beyond the
boundaries of nuisance law.
V. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, STATE OWNERSHIP OF WILDLIFE,
AND CUSTOM AS BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES
Although nuisance law is just one source of the background
principles of American property law, Huffman questions whether our list
of other background principles derived from the case law we surveyed
was accurate. In this section we examine three of the more venerable
background principles: the public trust doctrine, state ownership of
wildlife, and customary rights. As we demonstrated with respect to his
assault on our description of nuisance law as a background principle, we
show that Huffman again considered neither the history nor the case law
of these doctrines closely.

143. Huffman, Beware of Greens, supra note 7, at 859.
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The Public Trust Doctrine

Huffman’s examination of the history of the public trust doctrine
claims that the doctrine, as understood today, did not exist in either
Roman or English law.144 Given his propensity to overlook case law that
does not support his ideology,145 one might question the accuracy of this
claim, particularly since Huffman’s study was not based on original
historical research.146 Moreover, although Huffman contends that the
nineteenth-century evolution of the scope of the doctrine from tidelands
to all navigable waters was a salutary judicial development, he maintains
that the doctrine’s evolution in the twentieth century to protect
environmental resources represented unwarranted judicial activism.147
This dichotomy is less a principled distinction than a policy preference for
economic development over environmental protection.
Our earlier study discussed several examples of courts employing the
public trust doctrine as a background principle to defeat taking claims.148
This case law has continued to mature into the present. For example, a
Florida trial court rejected oceanfront landowners’ claims that the county
took their property by posting signs on the dry sand beach to regulate
public vehicular access, on the ground that the dry sand was burdened by
public rights of access and use arising under the public trust, among other
doctrines.149 Moreover, the Hawaiian Court of Appeals ruled that the
Hawaiian Constitution “adopts the public trust doctrine as a fundamental
principle of constitutional law in Hawai’i” that “clearly diminishes any
expectation that oceanfront owners in Hawai’i had and may have in
future accretions to their property.”150

144. James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths: A History of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY. F. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Huffman, Inconvenient Truths].
145. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
146. See Huffman, Inconvenient Truths, supra note 144, passim (relying heavily on Patrick
Devaney, Title, Jus Publicum and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13
(1976); Glen J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in Civil and Common Law: Historical
Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 511 (1975)).
147. Huffman, Inconvenient Truths, supra note 144, at 96–103.
148. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at 342 (discussing McQueen v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119–20 (S.C. 2003); Coastal Petroleum v. Chiles, 701 So.2d 619, 624
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Esplande Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 987 (9th
Cir. 2002); R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin, 628 N.W.2d 781, 788 (Wis. 2001); Wilson v.
Massachusetts, 583 N.E.2d 894, 901 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 597 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1992)).
149. See Trepanier v. County of Volusia, 2005 WL 6273786 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005) (relying also
on custom, dedication, and prescription), aff’d, 965 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
(affirming the lower court’s takings analysis, remanding for a factual determination on the issue
of custom, and reversing the lower court’s determination that the land was publicly dedicated).
150. Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State, 2009 WL 5127980, at *21 (Haw. Ct. App.
2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Even if the public trust doctrine in England and Rome did not
resemble the modern doctrine, the ancient doctrine did recognize the
vulnerability of publicly valuable resources to monopolization.151
Differences in the details of the doctrine over time are less significant
than the fact that three vastly different societies recognized the need to
protect public rights in certain natural resources.
B.

State Ownership of Wildlife

Another object of Huffman’s criticism is the wildlife trust, a
consequence of state sovereign ownership of wildlife in trust for the
people.152 This doctrine, as ancient as either the public trust or customary
rights doctrine, requires the state trustee to manage wildlife for the
benefit of the people,153 not unlike the public trust doctrine. A number of
courts have recognized the wildlife trust as a background principle,154 but
Huffman charged that its alleged “deep roots in the common law” were
suspect, based on his study of Roman and English law.155 Yet, virtually all
states claim ownership of the wildlife within their borders,156 and many do
so on the basis of common law interpretations.157 There are no reported
takings concerning harvest management, which suggests that the wildlife
trust is a viable background principle. Future cases will likely inquire
whether the wildlife trust is a background principle sufficient to defeat
takings claims concerning habitat protection.158
C.

Custom

Finally, Huffman objects to custom as a background principle on the
basis of Justice Scalia’s dissent from a denial of certiorari in the Stevens v.
City of Cannon Beach case,159 which claimed that “if it cannot fairly be
said that an Oregon doctrine of custom deprived Cannon Beach property

151. See Harrison C. Dunning, Antiquity of the Public Right, 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS ch. 29 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed. 2009).
152. See Thomas A. Lund, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW 28–29 (1980); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE &
DALE D. GOBLE, WILDLIFE LAW: A PRIMER 21–35 (2009).
153. See FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 152, at 22–23.
154. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at 353 (discussing New York v. Sour Mountain
Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78, 84 (2000); Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 338, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)).
155. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 9 n.44, (citing Huffman, Inconvenient
Truths, supra note 144).
156. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust:
The American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 707–10 (2005).
157. See id. at 708.
158. See id. at 713–19 (suggesting also that the wildlife trust may impose duties as well as
power on states and contending that it may authorize the imposition of damages for injuries to
wildlife and wildlife habitat).
159. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 9 n.42.
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owners of their rights to exclude others from the dry sand, then the
decision now before us has effected an uncompensated taking.”160
Presumably, such a taking would result if the state failed to provide an
“objectively reasonable” interpretation of its common law.161 Overruling
a state supreme court on its interpretation of its common law would be
quite an enhancement of the power of federal courts to interpret state
law, conflicting with the received vision of what Justice Kennedy has
called “our federalism.”162 Huffman himself has railed against federal
overreaching of state prerogatives in other contexts.163
Moreover, it is more than a little odd that Huffman would object to
customary rights given his commitment to custom as a central force of
common law reasoning. He claimed that the judicial function of filling in
gaps in statutes was justified only by invocation of “contemporary custom
and behavior” and that there is no support for common-law judging
based on utilitarian instrumentalist reasoning “not reflected in custom
and precedent.”164 In fact, Huffman has characterized the common law as
merely “a formalization of custom, meant to evolve as custom evolves.”165
Yet apparently the Oregon Supreme Court’s recognition of the persistent
use of Oregon beaches for over a century was not a justification for
concluding that customary use of the beach was a background principle
defeating a takings claim.166 Like his one-way ratchet of nuisance law,
160. 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 n.18 (1992).
162. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[O]ur
federalism” allows the states, independent from federal direction, “to devise various solutions
where the best solution is far from clear.”). The modern understanding of “our federalism”
originated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (instructing that the concept represents
“a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government . . . always endeavors to [act] in ways that
will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.”). For other uses of the
phrase, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (“Although the Constitution grants broad
powers to Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner
consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of
the Nation.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (observing that separation
between state and national government “is one of the Constitution's structural protections of
liberty”). See also Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in the Supreme
Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1099, 1123 (1997) (discussing the Rehnquist
Court's understanding of federalism in the takings context).
163. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, The Impact of Regulation on Small and Emerging
Businesses, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 307, 316–17 (2000) (arguing for less federal
regulation and more local and state regulation of small businesses); James L. Huffman,
Environmental Perspectives: Moving toward a Market-Oriented Middle Ground, 28 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 61, 66–67 (2004) (advocating a greater role for state and local regulation in
environmental law).
164. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 21 & n.100; see supra note 39
(explaining Huffman as a successor to James Coolidge Carter).
165. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 23.
166. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993) (explaining that when
the ocean-front landowners purchased, “they were on notice that the exclusive use of the dry
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custom is apparently a centerpiece of common law reasoning for
Huffman except when it ensures public access to common property
resources.
VI. HUFFMAN’S “RULE OF LAW”
Huffman’s principal project has been to show that the judicial
evolution of the “background principles” defense to takings in the years
since the Lucas decision is inconsistent with his vision of the rule of law.
He employs the “rule of law” phrase no fewer than twenty-six times in his
articles criticizing our work.167 Examining what he means is revealing, for
we think it illustrates what may be a mainstream libertarian view of
property.
For Huffman, just as the common law is a formalization of custom,168
the rule of law “affirms the existing allocation of resources and
distribution of property rights.”169 This anti-redistributive philosophy
accounts for legal change grudgingly, if at all. Huffman suggests that
changes are exclusively the consequence of contractual agreements,
although he cites no documentation other than a law review article.170
From this rule of law perspective, the takings clause forbids any
uncompensated changes either by the courts or the legislatures not
consistent with Huffman’s version of custom.171
Huffman justifies this static vision of property on the basis of
protecting settled expectations, although he does not attempt to explain
either whose expectations need protection or the benefits of erecting a

sand areas was not a part of the ‘bundle of rights’ that they acquired, because public use of the
dry sand areas ‘is so notorious that notice of the custom on the part of persons buying land along
the shore must be presumed’”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994); accord State ex rel. Thorton v.
Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678 (Or. 1969).
167. See Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 1 (title), 12, 16, 18, 21 & n.102,
22, 23 & n.112, 24, 25, 29 (a total of seventeen references); Huffman, Beware of Greens, supra
note 7, at 820 n.20, 839, 843, 844 n.99, 847, 855, 858 (a total of nine references).
168. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
169. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 24.
170. Id. (“Where changed values or new understandings lead one party to desire that
ongoing impacts from the use of property of others be curtailed, the parties may alter the
allocation of resources by contractual agreement. As suggested by Zywicki, only when such
contractual or informal adjustments become the norm would the underlying assignment of rights
be properly shifted by a common law court.”) (citing Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing
Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and
Legislative Solutions to Large-Number Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 991
(1996)).
171. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 25–26 (suggesting that acts of
“judicial change that have no grounding in custom or practice” interfere with the common law
process, and that change “that is otherwise part of the common law process may be prohibited
by constitutional limitations” like the takings clause and its state constitutional equivalents). This
perspective on the takings clause was rejected by the Oregon electorate in 2007. See supra note
23.
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property regime around such protection.172 He does suggest that without
a commitment to the status quo, property jurisprudence will descend into
a “jurisprudence of politics,” again with no case-law documentation.173
The evolution of background principles over the last two decades is
apparently just such an example of straying from “foundational and
unchanging” principles in pursuit of “political progressivism,” a
“distortion of the common law process,” and an unconstitutional one at
that.174
Among the difficulties with this vision of the rule of law is that, as
even Huffman recognized, the common law never resisted all change.175
Thus, the issue is: how much change is tolerable? Surprisingly, under
Huffman’s vision of constitutional property, this is not a question that
courts can address, given his categorical requirement of absolute
protection of landowners’ settled expectations.176 As Huffman maintains:
Changing circumstances and new knowledge may require a
reconsideration of what adherence to particular principles requires, or
even lead to the abandonment of old principles and the adoption of
new ones. But the latter task is not one for the courts, particularly
courts sworn to uphold the higher principles of the constitution.177
Huffman’s paradigmatic vision of libertarian property emphasizes
the liberties of the landed over all others, favors intensive uses to
172. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 24 (“[I]f precedent is disregarded
without respect for settled expectations, the [unspecified] social and private benefits of custom
and the rule of law will be lost.”).
173. Id. at 26–27 (discussing Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence:
A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 316–17 (1993),
and claiming that Michelman’s “‘jurisprudence of principles’ will only be recognized by judicial
liberals.”). Huffman apparently dismisses the case law we discussed in detail with the comment
that it was the result of “presumably liberal” state courts and proceeds to suggest, perhaps
tongue-in-cheek, that “conservative” judges will not recognize principles such as public trust and
social responsibility because they either “know little” about such matters or are “blinded by a
bias for free markets and private profit.” Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 26.
Huffman’s political diatribe continued with a suggestion that the government could afford to pay
the compensation costs of his static view of property because “government does find money for a
multitude of other projects, including billions in political pork.” Id. at 28. This confidence in the
ability to compensate has no empirical basis. The results of recent property rights initiatives in
Oregon, see supra note 23, and Florida have produced nearly no examples of compensation paid
to landowners but have instead induced a large-scale deregulatory effect. See John D. Echeverria
& Thelka Hansen-Young, The Track Record on Takings Legislation: Lessons from
Democracies’ Laboratories (June 6, 2008) (Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No.
1138017), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138017.
174. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 27 (endorsing the notion of judicial
takings at 27 n.126).
175. Id. at 23–25. At other times, however, Huffman suggests that any judge-made changes
in property are constitutionally impermissible. See infra notes 176–177 and accompanying text.
176. See Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 29 (alleging that background
principles “never imagined by owners of private property [are] not in the common law
tradition.”).
177. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 27.
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sensitive uses, ignores ecological interconnections and responsibilities for
future generations, and denies that there is a public interest beyond the
maintenance of autonomous individuals and their voluntary actions.178
Huffman’s property also endorses the theory of natural rights, embracing
the notion that property principles are universal, applicable everywhere
and at all times.179 This abstract vision of property held sway throughout
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century only to be exposed by the
legal realists for its political motivations and discarded by the Supreme
Court by the late 1930s.180 Huffman’s interest in reviving the property
concepts of over a century ago apparently lies in his attempt to restrain
judicial discretion where it conflicts with his vision of separation of
powers181 and his version of the rule of law. The irony lies in that his
expansive vision of the takings clause requires judges to exercise an
enormous amount of discretion to reestablish a late nineteenth-century
vision of property.
VII. THE INEVITABILITY OF BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES
Justice Scalia’s invocation of background principles as the “logically
antecedent inquiry” in regulatory takings cases is a common-sense rule
whose utility is evidenced by the proliferation of background principles
defenses.182 As Professor Huffman acknowledges, the first question that
courts must address in takings cases is the nature of the claimant’s
property interest.183 Without such an interest, a regulatory takings claim
fails at the outset, since the takings clause states that “nor shall private
property be taken without just compensation.”184 Application of
background principles of property and nuisance law amounts to a
threshold inquiry into the character of an allegedly protected property
interest. Thus, the “background principles defense” should be one of the
first issues litigated in takings cases, for to proceed without an initial
consideration of background principles would risk awarding
178. See Freyfogle, supra note 50, at 102.
179. See id. at 104–05 (citing Douglas Kmiec, The Coherence of the Common Law, 26 VAL.
U. L. REV. 367, 368 (1991)).
180. See, e.g., HORWITZ, TRANSFORMING AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, supra note 26, ch. 7;
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1996).
181. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 22 (“Those who would have judges
adapt the common law to the perceived need of the present day or future society, even where
there are no gaps to be filled, would require judges to adopt the attitude of legislators. Not only
would judges step outside the judicial role, but they would also intrude on the legislative
function . . . .”).
182. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at 333–35, 341–54 (listing eight different categories
of “background principles” defenses).
183. Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 15 (endorsing Professor Epstein’s
four-part test).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

BLUMM&RUHLFORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

9/29/2010 1:14 PM

PRINCIPLES, TAKINGS, & LIBERTARIAN PROPERTY

839

compensation to a claimant without a showing of the requisite property
interest. Government defendants thus have a strong incentive to raise the
issue of background principles as a categorical defense early in takings
litigation. This strategy has succeeded in convincing courts not only to
expand the categories of background principles but also to apply
background principles as a threshold inquiry in case law beyond Lucastype economic wipeouts.185 Courts seem to be willing to decide cases on
“background principles” grounds because, by doing so, they can avoid
more difficult factual balancing.186
Again, herein lies irony. For Huffman, balancing tests and their
“abstract notions of reasonableness” are anathema, an invitation to
unwanted judicial activism.187 Instead, he advocates for the categorical
decisionmaking characteristic of legal formalism.188 Yet background
principles functioning as takings defenses enable courts to resolve cases
on formalistic, categorical grounds, much to Huffman’s chagrin who
viewed formalism as an ally in resurrecting a takings clause that would
compensate most landowners for the burdens of environmental
regulation.189
Because they are attractive to both government defendants and
courts, background principles are here to stay as the “logically
antecedent” inquiry in regulatory takings cases.190 Moreover, since they
often involve matters of state law, the federalism spawned by background
principles will be difficult to restrain by the Supreme Court.191 After all, a

185. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(announcing that takings claims would turn on a multi-factor balancing test, including (1) the
character of the government action, (2) the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, and
(3) the regulation’s interference with investment-backed expectations).
186. That is, the balancing required by Penn Central. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 3, at
326 n.26 (Lucas court acknowledging that anything less than total economic loss would require
Penn Central analysis).
187. See Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 21–25 (suggesting that nuisance
balancing that accounts for social conditions allows judges to make law based on “privilege,
interest, or influence” (at 21), which “intrude[s] upon the legislative function” (at 22), is
inconsistent with “the rule of law” (at 24), and is proscribed by the constitution’s takings clause
(at 25)).
188. See id. at 12, 16.
189. See James L. Huffman, Lucas: A Small Step in the Right Direction, 23 ENVTL. L. 901,
901–02 (1993) (celebrating the Lucas decision as having “promise from the point of view of those
interested in maintaining a coherent system of property rights, not to mention those interested in
complying with the Constitution.”); see also supra note 23 (concerning Huffman’s advocacy for a
statutory expansion of landowner compensation rights in Oregon).
190. Even Huffman seems to agree. See Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at
14 (“Of course [Blumm and Ritchie] are correct in saying that the antecedent inquiry into a
claimant’s property rights is here to stay . . . .”).
191. Justice Scalia’s Lucas opinion did state that the Court would review state court
interpretations of background principles to ensure that they were “objectively reasonable
interpretations” of state law. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 n.18 (1992)
(“We stress that an affirmative decree eliminating all economically beneficial uses may be
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Court committed to states-rights federalism would seem unlikely to
attempt to police a state court’s view of the development of its common
law, especially concerning venerable property concepts.
For all of these reasons, Lucas’ addition of “background principles”
as takings defenses appears to be a permanent feature of the takings
landscape. Since background principles help define the property rights
alleged to have been taken, government defendants will ask courts to
consider them early in takings litigation. Therefore, background
principles will continue to function as a threshold which claimants must
hurdle before evaluating a regulation under a balancing test or deciding
whether it worked a Lucas-type economic wipeout.
CONCLUSION
Professor Huffman’s advocacy of libertarian property and freemarket environmentalism is well known.192 So his criticism of our work on
background principles is not altogether surprising, to the extent that he
interpreted what we wrote as a threat to his vision of a vigorous takings
clause requiring compensation for numerous regulatory restrictions on
landowners. But we think the nature of his critique is quite flawed: he
assumed we were mounting a normative argument calling for courts to
create new background principles to defeat takings claims, when in fact
we were merely observing what courts were actually doing. His criticism
would have been more cogent had it directed attention to the unfolding
case law and attempted to explain its alleged shortcomings. Huffman’s
premise that background principles are only of common law origin
overlooks a good deal of case law, including at least one Supreme Court
opinion that Justice Scalia himself signed.193 Similarly, his criticism of
nuisance and property background principles lacks a focus on history and
the reasoning in the case law.
Moreover, Huffman’s complaint that background principles will
produce unwarranted judicial activism rings hollow from someone who is
committed to reviving the judicial activism of the legal formalists of a
century ago in the name of protecting select landowners through an

defended only if an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents would exclude
those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is presently found.”). But as Justice
Scalia’s dissent from certiorari denial in Stevens v. Cannon Beach acknowledged, the Supreme
Court will often lack a suitable factual record to make a determination of whether there is in fact
a regulatory taking. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that thin factual records may often require the Supreme Court to appoint a
special master to decide whether a taking has occurred).
192. See, e.g., supra notes 23, 189.
193. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent
in the Tahoe-Sierra case).
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unprecedented interpretation of the takings clause.194 His vision is that
judicial activism in the service of certain landowners is warranted, but
that state courts interpreting their state law traditions need close federal
oversight based on his interpretation of what the takings clause should
become.195 That is no recipe for judicial restraint. Instead, it seems more
like a political campaign.196

194. See supra notes 23, 44–48, 170–176, 190–191, and accompanying text.
195. Although he has written extensively on the takings clause, Huffman has never
explained in any detail where he thinks the boundary lies between regulations that do not
require taking and those that do, nor tried to justify such a boundary. Instead, he simply argues
that there should be more declarations of takings, and more compensation paid to landowners
wishing to pursue intensive land uses. Huffman’s aversion to background principles may be due
to his unfamiliarity with some basic property law concepts. For example, he suggests that what a
landowner needs to know about his property rights can be ascertained through a title search.
Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 19 (“When property is acquired, the purchaser
is well advised to do a title search, to confirm any existing easements or other encumbrances. If
no title search is conducted and one purchases without knowledge of a neighbor’s or a public
easement, there is no legal remedy for the resulting disappointment when the easement is
used.”). But of course any first-year law student would know that title searches will not uncover
unwritten implied easements from prior use, easements by necessity, prescriptive easements, or
easements by estoppel. Nor will record searches reveal adverse possession. See generally
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 194–220,
979–1101 (2007); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 112–56, 677–701 (6th ed. 2006).
196. See, e.g., Huffman, Background Principles, supra note 7, at 26 (accusing judges applying
background principles of being judicial liberals and suggesting that so-called liberal
commentators like Professor Michelman, supra note 168, might accuse “conservative courts [of
being] blinded by a bias for free markets and private profit”). Perhaps it is no coincidence that
Professor Huffman has recently decided to attempt to take his advocacy to the U.S. Senate,
winning the Republican nomination to challenge Oregon’s incumbent Senator Ron Wyden (DOR).

We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our
online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@
boalt.org. Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq.
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